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VENDOR AND PURCHASER-REAL ESTATE CONTRACTSThe Future of the Real Estate Contract in New Mexico: Huckins v.
Ritter

I. INTRODUCTION
The real estate contract is a contract for the purchase of land. It often
is used in lieu of a mortgage.' Real estate contracts generally are enforceable in New Mexico. 2 New Mexico courts, however, always have
noted that an exception will be made to the general rule of enforceability
if enforcement would "shock the conscience of the court." 3 In Huckins
v. Ritter,4 the New Mexico Supreme Court refused to enforce the forfeiture
provision of a real estate contract upon the purchaser's default, holding
that a forfeiture would shock the conscience of the court.'
The real estate contract used in Huckins contained a forfeiture provision
similar to those found in many real estate contracts. Ordinarily, such
provisions provide that, upon default by the purchaser, the vendor is
entitled to repossess the property and to retain all payments made on the
contract prior to the default. 6 Huckins, in light of other recent New Mexico
cases, makes it clear that the court will make an exception to the general
rule of enforceability of such provisions in order to protect buyers in
some situations. 7 Like the cases preceeding it, however, Huckins fails to
enunciate any specific test for determining when a forfeiture clause will
not be enforced.
This Note will review prior real estate contract cases in light of Huckins
in order to ascertain guidelines for future cases. It will discuss the use
of the real estate contract for the purchase of real property as an alternative
to the mortgage and the trust deed in the context of the history of the
real estate contract in New Mexico. This Note also includes suggestions
for the future use of real estate contracts in light of the Huckins decision.
1. Comment, Comparison of California Mortgages, Trust Deeds and Land Sale Contracts, 7
UCLA L. Rev. 83, 95 (1960); see also infra, notes 20-32 and accompanying text.
2. See Eiferle v. Toppino, 90 N.M. 469, 565 P.2d 340 (1977); Bishop v. Beecher, 67 N.M. 339,
355 P.2d 277 (1960).

3. See Hale v. Whitlock, 92 N.M. 657, 593 P.2d 754 (1979); Eiferle v. Toppino, 90 N.M. 469,
565 P.2d 340 (1977); Bishop v. Beecher, 67 N.M. 339, 355 P.2d 277 (1960).
4. 99 N.M. 560, 661 P.2d 52 (1983).
5. Id. at 562, 661 P.2d at 54.
6. See Nelson & Whitman, The Installment Land Contract-A National Viewpoint, 1977 B.Y.U.
L. Rev. 541, 542.
7. Huckins, 99 N.M. at 562, 661 P.2d at 54. For a detailed discussion of these cases, written
prior to the Huckins decision, see Note, The Real Estate Contract in New Mexico: Eiferle v. Toppino,
8 N.M.L. Rev. 247 (1978).
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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On July 28, 1981, Robert and Sylvie Huckins entered into a real estate
contract with Nancy Ritter for the purchase and sale of residential property
in Ruidoso, New Mexico. 8 The Huckins' made a $45,000 down payment
on the total purchase price of $155,000, and assumed an underlying real
estate note in the amount of $40,725.73.' The remaining balance, approximately $70,000, was due and payable on October 15, 1981, three
months after the contract was signed. " The Huckins' were unable to make
the $70,000 payment on October 15th, and on October 30th, Ritter notified the Huckins' that if the amount due was not paid within fifteen
days, she intended to exercise her right to retain all sums previously paid
under the contract."1 On November 30th, the Huckins' filed an action to
enjoin Ritter from terminating the contract or, alternatively, to provide
for the return of a portion of the down payment."2 Ritter then agreed to
extend the time for payment under the contract to January 10, 1982. The
on January 10, and on February
Huckins' failed to make the payment
13
contract.
the
terminated
Ritter
25,
In June of 1982, the trial court entered an order in the action filed by
the Huckins'. It ruled in favor of Ritter, upholding the forfeiture provision.
On appeal, the New Mexico Supreme Court reversed the trial court,
finding that the case fell within the exception to the general rule of
enforceability of forfeiture provisions. 14 The court held that the plaintiffs
were entitled to a return of the down payment, less a reasonable rental
payment for the period they occupied the property and the amount of any
dimunition to the property that may have occurred during the plaintiffs'
occupancy."5
III. DISCUSSION
The supreme court addressed two issues in Huckins v. Ritter. The first
issue, a procedural challenge to the appellants' right to appeal, was decided in favor of the Huckins' and is not discussed in this Note.' 6 The
8. Huckins, 99 N.M. at 561, 661 P.2d at 53. The
terms of the real estate contract used in this case were similar to terms generally found in such
contracts. A typical real estate contract states that time is of the essence, has an acceleration clause,
and provides for forfeiture of the vendee's rights in the event of a breach by the vendee. Comment,
supra note 1, at 83.
9. Huckins, 99 N.M. at 561, 661 P.2d at 53.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 562, 661 P.2d at 54.
16. Id. Ritter argued that the supreme court should refuse to consider the Huckins' argument on
appeal because of the Huckins' failure specifically to challenge certain findings of fact, as required
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second issue involved the substantive question of the enforceability of
the forfeiture clause of the contract. The court held that to allow the seller
to retain the $45,000 down payment and to regain possession of the
property, as provided by the terms of the contract, would be an unwarranted forfeiture. 7 The court relied on earlier New Mexico cases which
have recognized an exception to the general rule that the forfeiture terms
of real estate contracts are enforceable. 8 Courts apply this exception
when enforcement would result in a forfeiture or unfairness "which shocks
the conscience of the court. '"'9 The court, relying strictly on the specific
facts of the case, gave little explanation for its refusal to enforce the
forfeiture provision, and provided no general analysis or guidelines for
future real estate contract disputes.
A. Real Estate Contracts, Mortgages, and Deeds of Trust
The real estate contract often is used as an alternative to mortgages
and deeds of trust in the sale of real property."0 To understand the attractiveness of the real estate contract to vendors and purchasers, it is
important to understand the differences among real estate contracts, mortgages, and deeds of trust. One of the most important conceptual differences among these three security devices involves legal title. When a
mortgage is used, the legal title typically lies with the debtor-mortgagor.2 '
When a deed of trust is used, the legal title passes to a third party, the
trustee.22 In contrast, when the property is purchased through the use of
by N.M. R. Civ. App. 9(m). According to Ritter, the plaintiffs should have been bound by the
findings of fact because they never properly attacked them on appeal. The lower court findings were
that: (1)the Huckins' owed Ritter the sum of $69,274.65 and were unable to pay the sum by the
October deadline; (2) time was of the essence in the real estate contract; (3) 15 days after written
demand for payment had been made and had not been satisfied, Ritter was entitled to her election
of remedies; and (4) the Huckins' did not offer any evidence that the real estate contract did not
properly reflect the parties' intentions. The supreme court refused to accept Ritter's argument, holding
that the transcripts and briefs in the case were sufficient to present the essential question for review,
notwithstanding a technical violation of the rules. Huckins, 99 N.M. at 561, 661 P.2d at 53.
17. Huckins, 99 N.M. at 562, 661 P.2d at 54.
18. One of the most recent exceptions to the general rule was made in Eiferle v. Toppino, 90
N.M. 469, 565 P.2d 340 (1977). The court in Eiferle refused to enforce a forfeiture on a real estate
contract that occurred when the purchasers did not pay a $25 fee when they sent a payment to cure
a pending default. See infra notes 56-72 and accompanying text.
19. Huckins, 99 N.M. at 562, 661 P.2d at 54; Eiferle, 90 N.M. at 470, 565 P.2d at 341.
20. See Hetland, The CaliforniaLand Contract, 48 Cal. L. Rev. 729 (1960); Gerdes, Installment
Land Contracts: Legislative Protection of Defaulting Purchasers,52 Harv. L. Rev. 129 (1938).
21. Comment, supra note 1,at 83. At common law, the mortgage operated as a conveyance of
legal title to the mortgagee, but subject to defeasance upon payment of the debt. Although this theory
still applies in some states, in most jurisdictions the mortgagee has only a lien on the land, and title
passes to the mortgagor. R. Boyer, Survey of the Law of Property 499 (3rd ed. 1981). In New
Mexico, the mortgagor retains the legal title, while the mortgagee has a lien on the property. Griffith
v. Humble, 46 N.M. 113, 122 P.2d 134 (1942).
22. R. Boyer, supra note 21, at 511-12.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14

a real estate contract, the vendor retains the legal title until all payments
have been made on the contract.23
Another important difference is the method of repossession of the
property when a purchaser fails' to make the payments due. When a
mortgage is utilized, foreclosure occurs upon default by the mortgagee.24
Mortgage foreclosures are regulated by statute, and involve lengthy and
costly judicial proceedings. 25 Following judicial foreclosure, most states
allow a statutory period of redemption during which the mortgagor may
cure the default and redeem the property.2 6 The cost of the foreclosure
and the statutory right of redemption are problems creditors attempt to
avoid through the use of the deed of trust and the real estate contract.
In response to the problems inherent in mortgages, some states have
statutorily created the deed of trust as a device for the sale of real property.27
New Mexico, however, does not have a deed of trust act. A deed of trust
in New Mexico is subject to the same statutory provisions as a mortgage.2"
Use of a deed of trust in New Mexico, therefore, does not offer the same
advantages as it does in other states.
In contrast to the default procedures of the mortgage and the deed of
trust, when a purchaser under a real estate contract defaults, the seller
may bring an action under general contract theories. 29 If a forfeiture clause
similar to the one in Huckins is contained in a real estate contract, it
typically is enforceable. 3 Upon default, enforcement of the forfeiture
23. Comment, supra note 1, at 95.
24. R. Boyer, supra note 21, at 500-01. Some deed of trust statutes also allow the vendor to
chose either foreclosure or forfeiture upon default by the purchaser. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 33801 to -821 (Supp. 1972) (discussed infra note 27).
25. See Gose, The Trust Deed Act in Washington, 41 Wash. L. Rev. 94 (1966). See generally
N.M. Stat. Ann. §§48-7-1 to -10 (1978) (statutory regulation of mortgages in New Mexico).
26. Comment, supra note 1, at 88. New Mexico has a one year redemption period. N.M. Stat.
Ann. § 39-5-20 (1978).
27. Lawyer, The Deed of Trust: Arizona's Alternative to the Real Property Mortgage, 15 Ariz.
L. Rev. 194 (1973); R. Boyer, supra note 21, at 511; Gose, supra note 25, at 94.
For example, Arizona enacted the Deed of Trust Act in 1971. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 33-801 to
-821 (Supp. 1972). Upon default of the purchaser under a deed of trust in Arizona, the seller typically
has two options: he can either foreclose under mortgage foreclosure proceedings, in which case the
deed of trust is treated like a mortgage, or he can foreclose pursuant to the Trust Deed Act. Id.;
st33-807(A); Lawyer, supra, at 204. Such foreclosure typically involves a sale of the property by
the trustee. If the creditor chooses judicial foreclosure, he encounters the same problems involved
with mortgage foreclosures. In comparison, foreclosure pursuant to the Trust Deed Act does not
allow any redemption period and does not involve a lengthy court proceeding. The Act, however,
gives the purchaser a 90 day reinstatement period prior to the trustee's sale during which the purchaser
has the opportunity to cure his default. Lawyer, supra, at 199-200. This action most commonly is
taken with a trust deed. Foreclosure under a deed of trust in Arizona, therefore, typically is more
advantageous to the seller than foreclosure pursuant to a mortgage.
28. N.M. Stat. Ann. 8847-1-39 to -41 (1978).
29. Note, Reforming the Vendor's Remedies for Breach of Installment Land Sale Contracts. 47
S. Cal. L. Rev. 191, 199 (1973).
30. See Eiferle v. Toppino, 90 N.M. 469, 565 P.2d 340 (1977); Bishop v. Beecher, 67 N.M.
339, 355 P.2d 277 (1960).
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clause31is less time consuming than foreclosure proceedings under a mortgage.
The purchaser's interest under a real estate contract is easily eliminated
in comparison to judicial foreclosure and trustees' sales.32 The seller in
Huckins attempted to take advantage of this simple procedure for default.
The court refused to allow the forfeiture, however, and the advantage of
quick and inexpensive forfeiture under the real estate contract was lost
in this case.
B. History of the Real Estate Contract in New Mexico
As early as 1936, the New Mexico Supreme Court recognized that in
the case of a contract for sale of land before conveyance, the vendor has
the legal title to the land.33 Although the vendee has possession of the
land, the only method by which the vendee can prejudice that title is by
paying the purchase price specified in the contract.34
One of the first New Mexico cases to address the issue of whether the
forfeiture provisions of a real estate contract are enforceable was Bishop
v. Beecher.35 In Bishop, the purchasers entered into a real estate contract
for the purchase of a house. 36 By the terms of the contract, the purchasers
assumed an existing mortgage given by the vendors .3' Against the assertion that real estate contracts should be considered equitable mortgages,
giving a right of redemption to the vendee, the court upheld the forfeiture
provisions of the contract. The court found that the property involved
had a value in excess of $12,000, and that the purchasers had retained
possession and use at a cost of less than $60 per month for almost six
years prior to the default. 38 The court likened the payments to rent, and
held that a forfeiture under these circumstances was not inequitable. 39
The Bishop court, however, laid the foundation for an exception to the
general rule of enforceability of forfeiture provisions. The court noted
that the forfeiture provision will be enforced "absent unfairness which
shocks the conscience of the court. "' This recognition marked the first
step in the development of the exception to the general rule of enforceability of forfeiture provisions.
31.
bring
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Comment, supra note 1, at 97. If the contract has been recorded, the vendor will have to
a suit to quiet title; however, this is no more involved than a foreclosure proceeding. Id.
Id.
Dunken v. Guess, 40 N.M. 156, 56 P.2d 1123 (1936).
Id. at 159, 56 P.2d at 1125.
67 N.M. 339, 355 P.2d 277 (1960).
Id. at 340, 355 P.2d at 277.
Id. The contract was similar to the one used in Huckins. See supra note 8.
67 N.M. at 343, 355 P.2d at 279.
Id.

40. Id. at 343, 355 P.2d at 280.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14

Three years after Bishop, the court in Davies v. Boyd 4 ' held that, where
a contract can be given two possible constructions, courts will adopt the
construction that avoids a forfeiture.42 Davies involved a written contract
for the purchase of real estate. The purchase price of the property was
$17,500, of which $8,000 represented a promissory note payable two
years from the date of the contract. 43 The promissory note was secured
by a mortgage upon the buyers' other property. 44 The remainder of the
purchase price was payable at $100 per month including interest. Within
a few months, the purchasers defaulted on the monthly payments. 4" The
court allowed the seller to repossess the property and retain the monthly
payments previously tendered, as provided by the contract.4'6 The seller,
however, was not permitted to recover the amount due under the promissory note."

The seller maintained that he was entitled to the amount due under the
note because it was agreed upon in lieu of a down payment. 8 The court
refused to accept this interpretation, explaining that the seller, having
declared a forfeiture and electing to rescind the contract, could not as a
matter of law recover on a note that represented an unpaid part of the
purchase price. 49 In allowing the forfeiture, the court relied on Bishop,

stating that "[A] provision for forfeiture of installment payments made
prior to default, which approximate rent, will be approved, at least where
reasonable notice of default is required by the contract."°
In 1979, the court decided Hale v. Whitlock,5" another case involving
the sale of real property under a real estate contract. Prior to default, the
41. 73 N.M. 85, 385 P.2d 950 (1963).
42. Id. at 89, 385 P.2d at 952 (Moise, J., concurring specially).
An example of the court's ability to avoid a forfeiture is seen in Ott v. Keller, 90 N.M. 1, 558
P.2d 613 (Ct. App. 1976). In Ott, a real estate contract was used for the purchase of a house. The
contract provided for forfeiture if the purchasers defaulted on payments and remained in default for
15 days after written demand for payments. When the purchasers failed to make a monthly payment
four months after entering into the contract, the seller mailed a notice of default, which allowed the
purchaser to cure the default by making the payment within 15 days from the effective date of the
notice. The notice was mailed on February 4, 1976. On February 20, the sellers withdrew the papers
from the escrow agent, effecting a forfeiture, and refused to accept the monthly payment offered by
the purchasers that afternoon.
The court refused to enforce the forfeiture provision, interpreting the "effective date of the notice
of default" to be the day after it was mailed, making the latest date for curing the default February
20th. Id. at 4, 558 P.2d at 617. Although the court refused to enforce the forfeiture, the opinion
contains no reference to unfairness which shocks the conscience of the court.
43. 73 N.M. at 87, 385 P.2d at 950.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 88-89, 385 P.2d at 950-51.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 87, 385 P.2d at 951.
49. Id. at 89, 385 P.2d at 952.
50. Id. at 88, 385 P.2d at 951 (emphasis added).
51. 92 N.M. 657, 593 P.2d 754 (1979).
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purchasers continually failed to make some of the monthly payments on
time for several years. Eleven years after the parties entered into the real
estate contract, the original seller assigned her interest in the contract.
The purchasers were not notified that strict performance would be required
by the assignee. After demanding that the purchasers make twenty-five
delinquent payments totalling $1,675, the assignee brought an action to
declare the contract in default. The supreme court held that the trial court
properly exercised its equity jurisdiction in granting the purchasers additional time to pay off the entire balance due on the contract.52 Emphasizing that the seller had not objected to the late payments, the court
concluded that the purchasers were reasonable in believing that the seller
would not insist upon prompt payment of the monthly installments.53 The
court recognized that real estate contracts are enforceable in New Mexico
and that the vendor may terminate the contract upon default, regain
possession of the property, and retain payments made. 54 It held, however,
"that there are exceptions to this rule, and that under certain circumstances, the contract and acts of the parties should be construed if at all
possible to avoid a forfeiture. ,,51
Another real estate contract case decided in the 1970's was Eiferle v.
Toppino, where the facts followed the same pattern as earlier real estate
contract cases. The contract provided for a total payment of $23,500.
The purchasers made a down payment of $3,000 and assumed a mortgage
of approximately $17,000 given to Prudential Insurance Company." The
purchasers also agreed to pay the seller's equity balance in the house,
totalling approximately $3,000, in monthly installments of $30 or more
to a designated escrow agent.58
In March of 1975, five years after entering into the contract, Prudential
returned one of the purchasers' monthly mortgage payments because the
bank had dishonored the check. 9 Prudential sent a letter with the returned
check threatening to initiate foreclosure proceedings.' ° In the letter, the
purchasers were given an opportunity to pay all existing delinquencies
than March 31, 1975.61 Prudential
by sending the sum of $573.89 no later
62
sent a copy of the letter to the seller.
The purchasers sent a cashier's check to Prudential in the amount
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 658, 593 P.2d at 755.
Id. at 657, 593 P.2d at 754.
Id. at 657-58, 593 P.2d at 754-55.
Id. at 658, 593 P.2d at 755.
90 N.M. 469, 565 P.2d 340.
Id. at 469, 565 P.2d at 340.
Id.
Id. at 470, 565 P.2d at 341.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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requested.63 The company received the payment on or before April 1,
1975.' Meanwhile, on March 28, 1975, the seller sent a demand letter
to the purchasers, claiming the deficiency in the mortgage payment owed
to Prudential constituted a default.6" The purchasers received this letter
on March 29, 1975.66 Although Prudential applied the cashier's check to
the mortgage, the escrow agent refused to accept the payment owed to
the seller unless the purchasers also paid $25, which the contract required
to cover the costs of the demand letter.6 7 The $25 was not paid, and the
seller withdrew the escrow papers, filed an affidavit of default and forfeiture, and filed a special warranty deed.68 Title to the property was thus
conveyed back to the seller.
The purchaser brought an action seeking a declaration of the rights of
the parties under the real estate contract. The supreme court held that the
terms of the contract would not be enforced because, under the specific
facts of the case, enforcement would shock the conscience of the court.69
Again the court noted that real estate contracts generally are enforceable
in New Mexico, 7° but it also recognized that there is an exception to the
general rule. 71 In Eiferle, the court specifically found, given the facts
involved, that the purchasers met the demands made by Prudential. Under
the particular facts of the case, the court held that a forfeiture would
result in "unfairness which shocks the conscience of the court." 7 2
In each of the above cases, the court relied upon specific facts to
determine whether the forfeiture clause in the real estate contract would
be enforced. The court mentioned the test of unconscionability in each
case, but failed to define it. The only guidelines given come from the
cases where the court refused to enforce the forfeiture clause of the
contract; the "guidelines" are the specific facts in each case. While it
appears that the court is reaching equitable results in these cases, purchasers and sellers have little assurance that a specific real estate contract
will be enforceable following these decisions.
C. Huckins v. Ritter
Huckins v. Ritter followed the same analytical approach as Eiferle. In
refusing to uphold the forfeiture in Huckins, the court focused on the fact
that the purchasers had possession of the property for only a brief time,
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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that the down payment was nearly one-third of the purchase price of the
house, and that the market value at the time of the forfeiture was equal
to the original sale price. 73 These facts appear to have been the sole basis
for the determination of unconscionability which led to the court's refusal
to uphold the forfeiture provision in the contract.
It is significant that the down payment made in Huckins constituted
nearly one-third of the total purchase price of $155,000. 7 ' When little or
no down payment is made on a real estate contract and payments made
prior to the default are substantially equivalent to the rental value of the
property, it is not difficult to equate the loss from a forfeiture with rental
payments, and to conclude that there is no hardship for the purchaser. In
contrast, in a situation such as the Huckins case forfeiture results in a
substantial loss to the buyer with a windfall for the seller. This is because
the seller retains the large down payment in addition to the amount of
money paid under the contract. These payments combined usually exceed
the fair rental value of the property.
The court's emphasis on the brief period of occupancy and the lack of
change in market price also is significant. It clearly indicates that the
court will consider all aspects of each situation to determine what is fair,
rather than considering only whether the forfeiture would be unfair to the
purchasers. A different result may have been reached if one of these
factors did not exist, even in light of the large down payment. In fact,
the court has recently stated that a high down payment alone will not
cause a forfeiture clause to be unconscionable. 75
In light of the facts of the case, the result in Huckins hardly can be
criticized. The lack of specific guidelines or analysis in Huckins and
previous cases, however, makes it difficult to predict the result of future
defaults.76
73. 90 N.M. at 562, 661 P.2d at 54.
74. Id. While the amount of the down payment is important, a large down payment will not
automatically trigger the exception to enforceability of a forfeiture clause. Manzano Industries, Inc.
N.M. -_, 678 P.2d 1179 (1984); see infra note 77.
v. Mathis, N.M. at -_, 678 P.2d at 1180; see infra note 77.
75. Manzano, 76. Less than one year after Huckins was decided, the supreme court decided Cape v. Mullins,
100 N.M. 525, 673 P.2d 502 (1983). In this case, the purchaser defaulted on a real estate contract
after making six monthly payments totalling approximately $2,500. The down payment on the contract
was $5,000. Id. at 526-27, 673 P.2d at 503-04. The main issue on appeal was whether the district
court erred in not ordering a reinstatement of the real estate contract. Id at 527, 673 P.2d at 504.
The supreme court held that the trial court did not err because the facts of the case did not support
an exception to the general rule of enforceability of forfeiture provisions in real estate contracts. Id.
at 528, 673 P.2d at 505. The court relied heavily upon the facts of the case, and stated that "the
legitimate use of real estate contracts as a worthy financing method in New Mexico would be
jeopardized, should [the parties] be denied the rights for which they contracted." Id.
The Cape decision should have little effect on the development of the law because the court relied
heavily on the unique facts involved and applied the same general language as earlier cases. The
decision, however, does support the conclusion that forfeiture provisions in real estate contracts will
be enforced when the payments forfeited can be equated to the fair rental value of the property.
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D. The Utility of the Real Estate ContractAfter Huckins
Although the New Mexico Supreme Court has not provided any clearcut rules for real estate contract disputes,77 it is clear that forfeiture
provisions in real estate contracts will be allowed in the future where the
payments forfeited can be likened to rent. It is also clear that forfeiture
provisions in real estate contracts will not be enforced in situations similar
to Huckins and Eiferle.
It appears that the court is applying traditional notions of contract law
in these cases. At the same time, it is using equitable remedies to provide
greater protection for the defaulting purchaser. The reason for this method
of analysis can be explained by several factors. First, penalty provisions
are not favored,7" and forfeiture provisions often look more like penalties
than liquidated damage clauses because they do not state a specific sum
of money to be forfeited upon default.79 Second, when payments are made
77. The lack of guidelines is illustrated by two other cases involving real estate contract defaults
decided by the New Mexico Supreme Court since Huckins and Cape: Manzano Industries Inc. v.
Mathis, - N.M. -_, 678 P.2d 1179 (1984) and Martinez v. Martinez, N.M. -,
678 P.2d
1163 (1984).
In Martinez, the court held that the right of the seller to declare a forfeiture under a real estate
contract may be exercised only after giving the purchaser reasonable notice of the default. The court
defined "reasonable time" as not less than 30 days. N.M. at - , 678 P.2d at 1167-68. The
Martinez court refused to enforce the forfeiture provision of the contract, because the purchaser
was given less than 30 days notice of the default. While the court did not uphold the forfeiture
provision, the case was remanded with instructions that the sellers be allowed toforfeit the contract
and demand that the purchaser reconvey her interest should she fail to cure the default within 30
days. Id. at -,
678 P.2d at 1168. The court relied on language from previous cases, basing its
holding on the finding that a forfeiture would shock the conscience of the court, because the purchaser
was not given adequate notice. Id. at -,
678 P.2d at 1167-68. The lack of a 30 day notice of
default is the most specific reason for refusing to enforce a forfeiture provision seen in any real
estate contract case to this date.
The most recent real estate contract case decided by the supreme court is Manzano Industries.
The court upheld the forfeiture clause of the real estate contract involved. N.M. at -,
678
P.2d at 1180. Again, the court considered all of the circumstances of the case, and noted in particular
that the purchasers had failed to meet all of their obligations under the contract. These obligations
were: 1) to make timely monthly payments; 2) to keep the premises in good repair; 3) to keep the
premises insured; and 4) to pay taxes on the property. Id. Although a substantial down payment was
made on the contract, the court refused to allow this factor to trigger the exception to enforceability.
The court specifically stated: "We refuse to hold that the forfeiture of a large down payment will,
in every case, shock the conscience of the court. The size of the forfeited down payment is only
one of the factors the trial court should consider." Id. Although the court did not enumerate other
factors, it is apparent that the facts mentioned above were of utmost importance for the court's
holding.
78. Corbin, The Right of a Defaulting Vendee to
Restitution of Instalments Paid, 40 Yale L.J. 1013, 1016 (1931).
79. Liquidated damages typically bear a reasonable relationship to the actual damage caused by
a breach, and contract provisions for liquidated damages generally areenforceable. In contrast, a
penalty is a type of punishment for the breach, and it bears no relation to the actual damages incurred.
A penalty may easily result in unjust enrichment of the non-breaching party, and generally isunenforceable. Lee, Remedies For Breach of the Installment Land Contract, 19 U. Miami L. Rev. 550,
552 (1965). The problem lies in the fact that there is no general rule for determining whether a
provision is a penalty or liquidated damages. Most courts look to the facts of the case, the intent
of the parties, and the construction of the contract to make this determination. Id.
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on a regular basis under a real estate contract, the amount of the forfeiture
increases as the purchaser performs under the terms of the contract.80
This result means that the penalty for the breach increases in inverse
proportion to the seriousness of the breach. Third, the actual injury suffered by a seller upon a purchaser's default can be difficult to determine,
due to possible depreciation or appreciation of the land, improvements
made on the land by the purchaser, and changes in the real estate market.
For these reasons, it is difficult for the court to apply general contract
rules to each case in a consistent manner.
In determining whether a forfeiture clause will be enforced upon a
purchaser's default, the test appears to be whether the total amount paid
by the purchaser, including monthly payments made prior to the default
and any down payment, can be equated to the fair rental value of the
property during the period of possession by the purchaser. A court also
should consider any dimunition in the value of the property in making
the fair rental value determination. 8 When the payments made are extremely disproportionate to the fair rental value during the purchaser's
possession, a court should not uphold the forfeiture provision of the
contract. Instead, a court should demand that the seller return the amount
of the payments tendered, less the fair rental value of the property and
any dimunition in the value of the property during the purchaser's possession. This appears to be similar to allowing the seller to obtain reliance
damages, although the New Mexico courts have never defined the remedy
in these terms. The supreme court, however, has left open the possibility
of resorting to "fairness" and equity in cases which are difficult to decide
due to particularly unique circumstances.
E. Possible Reforms for the Use of the Real Estate Contract in New
Mexico
The advantages offered to vendors through the use of the real estate
contract, such as simple, inexpensive forfeiture upon default, may disappear as a result of courts' efforts to protect purchasers from unconscionable contract terms. In turn, the loss of advantages to vendors could
lead to the disappearance of the real estate contract in New Mexico. For
this reason, it is important that New Mexico develop a predictable method
of handling future defaults under these contracts.
The goal of any reform of the use of the real estate contract must be
to preserve as many of the advantages of real estate contracts as possible
80. See Corbin, supra note 78, at 1029. For example, if one defaults on a real estate contract
after making only one monthly payment, the most one stands to lose is the amount of that payment
and the down payment, if any. In comparison, if one defaults after making monthly payments for
several years, one stands to lose a great deal more, even though the breach is less significant.
81. See Huckins, 99 N.M. at 562, 661 P.2d at 54.
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while protecting the purchaser against unjust forfeiture.82 The reform also
must permit the contract to operate under clear and recognized standards
so that both vendors and purchasers will know the effect of a breach
without resort to judicial resolution.
Several states have developed legislative and judicial reforms aimed
at solving the problems involved in the use of real estate contracts.83 The
California courts have de-emphasized the contract aspects of real estate
contracts in favor of protections similar to those given to mortgagors. 4
Other states have adopted the statutory deed of trust as an alternative
security device to the traditional mortgage.85 In New Mexico, however,
the deed of trust is indistinguishable from a mortgage, and subject to the
same statutory conditions.86
The New Mexico Supreme Court has consistently stated that public
policy supports the use of real estate contracts in New Mexico.87 The
court has stated that its refusal to enforce forfeiture provisions "when
fairness and legal principles dictate that [it] should not" does not undermine the market for real estate contracts. 8 8 It is apparent from Huckins
and the cases decided more recently that drastic judicial reforms are not
forthcoming.89 In addition, the court has yet to suggest that legislative
reforms would be appropriate.
A possible legislative reform would be to enact a statute regulating
forfeitures by allowing the purchaser upon default to recover an amount
equal to the total principle payments made under the real estate contract,
less the fair rental value of the property while in the possession of the
purchasers. 9 Another possibility would be the enactment of a detailed
statute regulating all aspects of the real estate contract. 9 '
82. Lee, Defaulting Purchaser'sRight to Restitution Under the Installment Land Contract, 20
U. Miami L. Rev. 1, 19 (1965).
83. For example, Maryland enacted a statute designed
to prevent forfeitures in certain cases. See Md. Real Property Code Ann. §§ 10-101 to -110 (1981).
California also has attempted to protect purchasers from unconscionable forfeitures. See Note, supra
note 29; Barkis v. Scott, 34 Cal. 2d 116, 208 P.2d 367 (1979).
84. See Note, supra note 29, at 199.
85. See Gose, supra note 25, at 104.
86. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §48-7-7 (1978); id.
§§ 47-1-39 to -41.
N.M. __, 678 P.2d 1179 (1984); Martinez
87. E.g., Manzano Industries, Inc. v. Mathis, v. Martinez, N.M. , 678 P.2d 1163 (1984).
N.M. at -, 678 P.2d at 1167.
88. Martinez, N.M. __, 678 P.2d 1179 (1984); Martinez v. Martinez, 89. See, Manzano Industries, N.M. -_, 678 P.2d 1163 (1984) Cape v. Mullins, 100 N.M. 525, 673 P.2d 502 (1983).
90. This, in effect, would codify what the court apparently is doing in situations similar to the
situation presented in Huckins. Such a statute would have to recognize, and make exceptions for,
situations in which the default was made in bad faith in order to protect sellers from purchasers who
decide they no longer wish to be a party to the contract for reasons other than inability to pay. Such
a statute may remove any incentives for sellers to use real estate contracts because sellers would
stand to gain little upon a purchaser's default. On the other hand, this type of statute would provide
both vendors and purchasers with clear and concise guidelines upon default under a real estate
contract.
91. Such a statute has been suggested by Professor Richard H. Lee. See Lee, supra note 82, at
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A more radical remedy would be to enact the Uniform Land Transactions Act (ULTA) 92 in New Mexico. The purposes of the ULTA are: 1)
to simplify, clarify, and modernize real estate transaction law; 2) to promote interstate flow of funds for real estate transactions; 3) to protect
consumers against unreasonable risk; and 4) to achieve uniform real estate
laws among the states.93 The scope of the ULTA includes all contractual
real estate transfers, including transfers for security and transfers of limited interests, such as leases and easements. 94
The ULTA provides predictable methods for handling forfeitures and
determining damages upon the breach of a real estate contract. Although
the ULTA has not been adopted by any state as of this writing,9' it should
be carefully considered as a viable solution to the problems currently
facing the real estate business.
IV. CONCLUSION

It may indeed be true, as the New Mexico Supreme Court claims, that
the supreme court's occasional refusal to enforce forfeiture provisions in
real estate contracts has not effected the viability of the real estate contract
21-24. The most important aspect of the statute suggested by Professor Lee is that it prohibits any
provision in real estate contracts for forfeiture of any payments made exceeding 10% of the purchase
price. The statute also requires that restitution be made to the purchaser upon default of all payments
in excess of the amount of money stipulated as liquidated damages. Id. at 22.
These two provisions appear to solve the recurring problems caused by defaults on real estate
contracts. First, the 10% allowance for liquidated damages provides some incentive for the seller
to use a real estate contract instead of a conventional mortgage because the provision would allow
the seller to retain more money upon default than the seller could retain as reliance damages in some
situations. At the same time, the purchaser is protected by the provision that requires restitution in
excess of the specified amount of liquidated damages. Finally, the statute makes express provision
for foreclosure, including required grace periods upon the purchaser's default. This provision provides
the simplicity lacking in mortgage foreclosures, while also providing certainty for both the buyer
and the seller upon default.
92. Uniform Land Transactions Act (National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws)(1978). No state has yet enacted the ULTA. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, Uniform Laws Annotated Directory of Acts-Tables Index (Master ed. 1983).
93. Uniform Land Transactions Act § 1-102.
94. Uniform Land Transactions Act, Article Two.
Several provisions of the ULTA are of particular interest. Section 1-311, for example, allows the
court, upon finding that a contract or contract clause was unconscionable at the time the contract
was entered into, to refuse to enforce the contract, or to limit the application of any unconscionable
clause to avoid an unconscionable result. In addition, Part Five of Section Two of the ULTA provides
specific remedies for the seller upon the purchaser's breach. Uniform Land Transactions Act § 2504.
Perhaps the section of greatest interest is section 2-516, which allows liquidated damages to be
fixed by agreement, "but only in an amount that is not unreasonable in the light of the anticipated
or actual harm caused by the breach." Id. This section explicitly states that a provision for unreasonably large liquidated damages is void. In addition, if the buyer breaches, the buyer is entitled to
restitution of any amount by which the sum of his payments exceeds the amount of liquidated
damages to which the seller is entitled. Id. This provision could solve the problem of unconscionable
forfeitures while also providing enough incentive for the seller to use a real estate contract because
it appears to put a reasonable, but not prohibitive, limit on the amount of money a seller can expect
to receive upon a buyer's default.
95. See supra, note 92.
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in New Mexico. A problem, however, lies in the uncertainty which the
court has created by refusing to lay specific guidelines for the future.
Apparently, the court believes that concepts of "fairness" and equity will
provide adequate guidelines for those who enter into real estate contracts.
On one hand, the lack of specifics is necessary, and in fact beneficial,
due to the unique situations involved in individual real estate contract
defaults. Common sense would appear to be the best guide for predicting
whether a forfeiture provision will be enforced after Huckins.
On the other hand, the lack of specific guidelines creates uncertainty
among potential parties to a real estate contract, and may result in a flood
of litigation in the future. It seems likely that many defaulting purchasers
will go to court in an attempt to prevent sellers from enforcing forfeiture
provisions. This will effectively eliminate the advantage of the real estate
contract to the seller, and could lead to the disappearance of the real
estate contract in New Mexico.
For the buyers and sellers in the real estate market who believe in the
ability of the New Mexico courts to make proper decisions based on
"fairness" and equity, the Huckins decision will pose few problems. For
those seeking more specific guidelines, however, the use of a real estate
contract may not be a viable method for the sale of land. After Huckins,
the only certainty is that forfeiture provisions in real estate contracts will
be enforced unless such enforcement would "shock the conscience of the
court." Exactly what this means depends upon the court's interpretation
of individual situations as they arise in future litigation.
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